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Abstract: Debates between contingentists and inevitabilists contest whether the results of 
successful science are contingent or inevitable. This paper addresses lingering ambiguity in the 
way contingency is defined in these debates. I argue that contingency in science can be 
understood as a collection of distinct concepts, distinguished by how they hold science 
contingent, by what elements of science they hold contingent, and by what those elements are 
contingent upon. I present a preliminary taxonomy designed to characterize the full range 
positions available and illustrate that these constitute a diverse array, rather than a spectrum. 
 
1. Introduction 
Ian Hacking, in The Social Construction of What?, asks his readers to assign themselves a 
number from one to five to describe how central contingency is to their personal conceptions of 
science. If you rate yourself at one, then you are a strong inevitabilitst, whereas if you choose 
five, you are highly contingentist and probably have strong constructionist sympathies (Hacking 
1999, 99). In response, Léna Soler questions whether this is the correct approach, and asks: 
“should we introduce degrees of contingentism depending on the kind of contingent factors that 
are supposed to play a role?” (Soler 2008a, 223). 
Herein, I answer Soler’s question in the emphatic affirmative, and therefore the question 
posed in the title with a resounding “no.” Contingency in science can be understood as a 
collection of distinct concepts, distinguished by how they hold science contingent, by what 
elements of science they hold contingent, and by what those elements are contingent upon. What 
separates one contingentist from another is not that one tags herself a two and the other fancies 
himself a five according with how strongly each believes science might have developed
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differently. Their disagreement arises from the fact that they understand contingency-producing 
factors to act differently on different aspects of the scientific process. Contingency is a “what” 
question, not a “how much” question. 
Before beginning this discussion I review the contingentist/inevitabilist (C/I) debate in 
Section 2 by reconstructing positions the debate’s central figures stake out. Ian Hacking, who 
coined the terms “contingentism” and “inevitabilism,” figures centrally. I also discuss several 
scholars who were retrospectively cast as interlocutors in the debate, such as Andrew Pickering, 
Sheldon Glashow, and James Cushing, and those who responded to Hacking directly, namely 
Léna Soler and Howard Sankey. After demonstrating how their conceptions of contingency have 
defined the debate, I argue that the conversation wants for a clear understanding of contingency 
and suggest how this ambiguity might be clarified by more rigorous classification of the concepts 
it groups together. 
Section 3 presents a detailed discussion of the nature of contingency in science, in which 
I outline a fresh taxonomy of the concept. The taxonomy builds on John Beatty’s distinction 
between unpredictability contingency and causal dependence contingency (Beatty 2006). This 
distinction clarifies the debate substantially, but I argue that a second step is required. Further 
decomposing unpredictability contingency and sub-classifying causal dependence contingency—
based on the things within science considered to be contingent and the factors they are presumed 
to be contingent upon—allows more precise characterization of the views under discussion. A 
detailed picture of ways different authors use contingency serves as a basis from which to 
examine how a nuanced account of the concept can clarify some persistent ambiguities in the C/I 
debate. 
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2. Contingency and Inevitability 
Ian Hacking coined “contingentism” and “inevitabilism” in the same book in which he 
hinted that contingency might be understood as a spectrum. Contingency appears as a feature of 
his effort to understand the philosophical stakes of social constructionism. Hacking casts 
contingency as a sticking points between constructionists and their opponents. He identifies the 
constructionist program as seeking to undermine claims about the inevitability of ideas. When 
generalized, according to Hacking, the constructionist argument takes the form “X need not have 
existed, or need not be at all as it is, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not 
inevitable.” It often proceeds to two other more advanced stages, which contend a) that X is bad 
in its current form, and therefore b) should be eliminated or radically altered (Hacking 1999, 6). 
The constructionist program meets irreconcilable opposition from inevitabilists when it claims 
that the results of scientific investigation are contingent, and therefore unconstrained by the 
structure and properties of the natural world. 
Andrew Pickering, author of 1995’s Constructing Quarks, is Hacking’s paradigm 
contingentist. Pickering advanced the view that high energy physics’ Standard Model resulted 
from an exegesis of data, which could have produced any one of numerous, ontologically 
incompatible interpretations. He concludes that physics might have escaped the twentieth century 
quark free, and that if it had, it would not be any less successful (Pickering 1984). Hacking 
interprets this argument in light of later work, The Mangle of Practice (Pickering 1995), wherein 
Pickering argued that scientific consensus arises from negotiation between theory applied to the 
world, theory applied to instruments, and the construction of the instruments themselves to 
develop a robust fit with observed data. The results of science are contingent from this 
perspective because the negotiation could be carried out in any number of ways, each resulting in 
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the same degree of self-described success. Pickering’s punch line is that twentieth-century 
physics could have been just as successful if, for example, cyclotrons had not supplanted 
traditional cloud-chamber technology and the resulting theory of the micro-world had not been 
dominated by quarks, which he contends are the peculiar progeny of the particle accelerator. 
Hacking elaborates the inevitabilist stance in “How Inevitable Are the Results of 
Successful Science?,” writing: “We ask: If the results R of a scientific investigation are correct, 
would any investigation of roughly the same subject matter, if successful, at least implicitly 
contain or imply the same results? If so, there is a significant sense in which the results are 
inevitable” (Hacking 2000, 61). Pickering would deny that equal success implies equivalence of 
any sort. By contrast, Hacking casts Sheldon Glashow as arch inevitabilist. Glashow holds that 
any investigation into the natural world starting from reasonable initial assumptions would 
produce not only the same answers, but also a similar set of questions to ask. Glashow imagines 
intelligent aliens as hypothetical scientists whose physical laws should be isomorphic with ours. 
In doing so, Hacking charges, Glashow tacitly makes crucial assumptions about the “reasonable” 
initial conditions necessary for alien science to produce the same results. How do we know, for 
example, that aliens would identify proton structure as an interesting question? Hacking segues 
from Glashow into the difficulties with strong inevitability claims: how stringently can you set 
the initial conditions before the argument dissolves into tautology? If the inevitabilist asserts that 
a successful alternate scientific enterprise will produce the same results by stipulating that 
success requires asking the same questions, using the same instruments to observe the same 
entities, and starting from the same assumptions, then we are left with the trivial observation that 
effectively identical scientific investigations produce effectively identical results (2000, 66). 
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Pickering and Glashow represent extremes; Hacking seeks a middle way. His 
compromise locates contingency at the level of the questions scientists ask. It is contingent, he 
argues, which questions are “live.” Live questions are those that make sense within the 
contemporary theoretical framework. Once science satisfactorily answers a live question we can 
take that result to be inevitable in some meaningful sense, but we have no guarantee that it would 
have been asked in the first place.1 Contingency, for Hacking, enters into science by allowing 
historical and socio-cultural factors to define what questions scientists find interesting and what 
questions they are allowed to ask. These questions are not necessarily answerable, and they 
might not make sense in any theory-independent sense, but once nature proves forthcoming with 
an answer, that answer has the tinge of inevitability. Science could have developed differently, 
but only because it could have addressed a different set of questions. Possible alternate results 
are never logically incompatible with current successful science (2000, 71). 
When distinguishing contingency from inevitability, Hacking observes the debate’s 
independence from the realism/anti-realism issue: “the contingency thesis itself is perfectly 
consistent with […] scientific realism, and indeed anti-realists […] might dislike the contingency 
thesis wholeheartedly,” (Hacking 1999, 80). Howard Sankey (2008) maintains the same 
separation between the debates. He defends weak fallibilism, consistent with an inevitabilist 
viewpoint, holding that individual results of science are contingent—individual instances of 
scientific investigation are fallible—but we can be confident that statistically inevitabilist 
tendencies will wash out local contingencies. 
Sankey defends his fallabilist stance’s compatibility with a contingency thesis, which he 
says is an epistemic claim about scientific practice and the way investigators engage with the 
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world: “Scientist might collect different evidence from the evidence they in fact do collect. They 
might have developed different instruments and techniques from the ones which have been 
developed and put to use” (Sankey 2008, 259). A geological example, the discovery of 
continental drift, illustrates his point: “The epistemic situation is […] dependent on contingent 
factors such as the availability of evidence and relevant knowledge, the development of 
instrumentation and the provision of research funding” (2008, 262). Sankey’s contingency 
differs from both Pickering’s and Hacking’s. Pickering would not contest that the factors Sankey 
identifies are contingent, but he would compile a list of additional contingencies much longer 
than Sankey would admit. Hacking argues for contingency of form rather than content of 
science: difference without incompatibility. Sankey points to the empirical content of science as 
contingent. These perspectives are not incompatible, but they have different emphases—Sankey 
focuses on evidence, Hacking on inquiry. 
Sankey subtly contrasts James Cushing, who argues that contingency has an 
“ineliminable role in the construction and selection of a successful scientific theory from among 
its observationally equivalent and unrefuted competitors” (Cushing 1994, xi). Cushing uses 
“theory” equivocally, as his prime example is the choice between Bohr’s and Bohm’s 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, which can be construed as competing window dressings 
of the theory of quantum mechanics rather than as theories themselves. Quibbling aside, Cushing 
argues that choices between observationally equivalent theories are contingent. He does not 
claim that such choices are irrational, but that they are guided by philosophical and other external 
criteria. In the case of Bohm versus Bohr, the interpretive question hinges on whether one 
abandons strict determinacy or strict locality in the quantum realm. Evidence suggests that either 
particles in quantum states, obeying the probabilities assigned by their wave functions, assume 
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classically observable values for their key properties—charge, spin etc.—during an observation 
event, or some “hidden variables” determine these properties, but instantaneous signaling across 
finite distances is permitted. The first violates an ingrained philosophical preference for 
deterministic processes in physics, while the second flaunts a tradition of skepticism about 
instantaneous action at a distance. Cushing’s view, exemplified by the claim that the Bohmian 
view’s defeat at the hands of Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation was contingent, involves no 
change in the empirical content of the theories in question. Nor does Cushingtonian contingency 
act on the data collection process—the crux of Sankey’s argument. 
Most who deploy contingency do so in pursuit of goals other than defining it. Sankey 
wants to show the independence of the C/I debate from discussions of realism. Léna Soler 
identifies this argument as a premature, writing: “the ‘contingentism versus inevitabilism’ 
contrast does not exist as an autonomous, well identified issue of significance,” (Soler 2008b, 
232). On the basis of this ambiguity she sets out to clarify the issue, employing a thought 
experiment involving two, isolated communities of physicists, starting with the same initial 
conditions, asking their own questions, unguided by the work of the other scientists:  
Human beings might have succeeded in developing a physics as successful and 
progressive as ours, and yet asked completely different physical questions from the ones 
that have actually been asked, with the result that the accepted answers—in other words 
the content of the accepted physical theories and experimentally established physical 
facts—would be at the same time robust and different from ours. (2008b, 232) 
 
Any non-trivial contingency, Soler contends, requires that two isolated scientific communities 
starting from the same point produce “irreducibly different” results, while still satisfying a 
reasonable set of criteria for success (2008b, 232). 
Soler’s contingency involves deep and irreconcilable oppositions between competing 
physical theories. Given the constancy of the initial conditions in Soler’s thought experiment, it 
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tests only whether science is contingent irrespective of the initial conditions, and does not 
consider to what extent science might be contingent upon antecedent conditions.2 Soler’s thought 
experiment does not assess the relative contributions of contingency to the collection of internal 
and external factors that influence the trajectory of science. 
Each scholar mentioned here questions how science might be contingent. In doing so, 
each employs a different understanding of what contingency means and at what point the claim 
becomes meaningful. They cast contingency in a qualitatively different ways rather than with 
differing intensities, representing diversity of kind, not of degree: 
Hacking: It is contingent what questions scientists decide are interesting. 
Pickering: It is contingent what ontological entities scientists claim to find in the natural 
world. 
Glashow: The theoretical structure of science is not contingent. 
Sankey: It is contingent what instruments and techniques are available to scientists. 
Cushing: It is contingent how scientists arbitrate between empirically equivalent 
theories. 
Soler: Science is contingent only if it has available at least two equally successful, but 
irreducibly different paths from any given starting point. 
A smooth scale of contingentism cannot capture their differences, even superficially. The next 
section systematizes the diversity of views sheltered within the contingency concept. 
 
3. Taxonomizing Contingency 
3.1. A Preliminary Distinction 
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Contingency is a wildly diverse concept. How can we refine our understanding of 
contingency so it can be applied with less ambiguity? John Beatty offers a crucial distinction 
between “contingent per se” and “contingent upon” (Beatty 2006). “Per se” contingency 
describes stochasticity in the historical process; it implies that the process of history itself is 
unpredictable. “Upon” contingency requires no unpredictability, but rather describes a historical 
process that is far from robust with respect initial conditions, indicating that outcomes have a 
measure of causal dependence on the relevant antecedent factors. Any change in initial 
conditions could lead to a different outcome, even if the outcome of the process is, in principle, 
predictable from any given set of initial conditions.  
In drawing this distinction, Beatty invokes Stephen J. Gould’s thought experiment: restart 
the story of evolution from the Cambrian explosion, and ask if “replaying the tape” in this way 
directs the history of life down a different path (Gould 1989). Gould argues that evolution is 
highly contingent, and the rerun would differ dramatically from the initial broadcast. As Beatty 
observes, Gould alternates between the unpredictability and causal dependence senses of 
contingency. Beatty argues that these two conceptions are compatible, but have different 
consequences for our understanding of the historical process. 
How should recognizing the distinction between these two varieties of contingency 
inform the C/I debate? Take Pickering: his 1984 claim that physics might have proceeded in a 
direction that did not include quarks is an unpredictability claim about scientific knowledge. He 
holds there that scientific knowledge is contingent per se. His view as reinterpreted by Hacking 
is an “upon” contingency claim. If the response to new data is a negotiation between existing 
theories, auxiliary theories about instruments, and the instruments themselves, then the 
consequent theory is contingent upon each of those three factors. In the second version of the 
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argument, Pickering’s stance gets its bite from the factors it identifies as causally relevant rather 
than from the unpredictability of the scientific process. 
Hacking, Soler, and Sankey, all observe that even the strongest inevitabilist admits that a 
benign form of historical contingency shapes the course of science. The Bragg family might have 
gone into sheep shearing rather than physics, and the resulting disturbance in the development of 
x-ray crystallography would likely have substantially altered the story of the discovery of DNA’s 
structure. The Cold War might have dragged on a few years longer, the United States Congress 
might have been friendlier towards basic research expenditures, the Superconducting Super 
Collider might have been built, and high energy physicists might no longer be looking for the 
Higgs boson. In Beatty’s language, inevitabilists are happy with the claim that scientific 
knowledge is contingent upon some historical factors, while denying the stronger claim that it is 
contingent per se. 
Beatty’s distinction substantially clarifies disagreements between inevitabilists and 
contingentists. They do not disagree about the extent to which scientific knowledge is contingent; 
they disagree about what kind of contingency influences the scientific process. Contingentists, as 
described by Hacking, admit both unpredictability and causal dependence contingency, while 
inevitabilists see no trouble from some types of causal dependence contingency, but draw the 
line at its more consequential sibling. This distinction does not exhaust the possible positions in 
the contingency debate. It demonstrates that Hacking’s method of rating contingency on a 
spectrum inadequately describes the commitments involved, but it only begins to capture the full 
range contingency claims available. Those who allow causal dependence contingency might 
have reasonable disagreements about what aspects of science are subject to contingency claims 
and what science can be reasonably said to be contingent upon. 
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3.2. Towards a Taxonomy of Contingency 
Each of Beatty’s categories might be decomposed further. First, consider unpredictability 
contingency. Beatty defines it as the belief that “the occurrence of a particular prior state is 
insufficient to bring about a particular outcome,” (Beatty 2006, 339). It appears that the 
unpredictability contingentist makes a strong metaphysical claim about the historical process: it 
is indeterministic. Indeed, Gould does appear to be making such indeterminacy claims. Should 
we replay the exact same tape of life from the exact same initial conditions and get a different 
result, then the process by which life develops exhibits intrinsic stochasticity. 
Indeterminacy is not, however, the only way to understand per se contingency. Beatty 
observes that contingency is the lynchpin of Gould’s argument that selection should not be the 
only causal agent evolutionary biologists invoke to explain the features and behaviors of present-
day organisms (see Gould and Lewontin 1979). This suggests that unpredictability, as applied to 
contingency, can be understood as a methodological argument. This weaker understanding 
would suggest that outcomes are contingent (per se) with respect to some specified set of causal 
factors. It does not rule out the ability of other causal factors to provide an exhaustive, 
deterministic explanation. In fact, it often suggests such factors. Such is Gould’s case against 
what he calls pan-selectionism—the assumption that selection can be invoked to explain any 
feature of an organism. The weaker version of unpredictability contingency he employs suggests 
that the features of organisms are contingent (unpredictable) with respect to selection effects. 
Such a view is consistent with deterministic evolution; it merely implies that factors other than 
selection are partly responsible. 
The strong version of unpredictability contingency, which we might call indeterminist 
contingency, implies randomness in the historical process. The weaker version, incompleteness 
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contingency, claims that some set of causal factors is inadequate offer a complete explanation of 
the historical process, and that outcomes are unpredictable with respect to that set of factors. 
These two forms do different types of philosophical work. Indeterminist contingency says 
something about how the world is. Incompleteness contingency brands a set of explanatory tools 
inadequate, and so depends on the state of scientific practice and must refer to established 
explanatory orthodoxy. 
Causal-dependence contingency is a more complicated case than unpredictability because 
the objects of “upon” might be expounded ad nauseam. The first step towards a classification 
requires identifying suitably distinct parts of science that might be held contingent. Science, like 
contingency, is heterogeneous and the claim that science is contingent can mean different things 
depending on what parts of science that claim specifies. Science makes ontological claims, 
formulates methodological procedures, develops models, adopts interpretations, and builds 
communities. Causal dependence contingency can be initially differentiated based on which of 
these many aspects of science are claimed contingent. I propose five categories: 
(1) Trivial contingency – Science is part of a historical process, and so is contingent in 
the same way human history is contingent. This weak claim covers individual 
scientists and the details of their everyday existences. 
All non-Laplacian parties are happy to admit this form of contingency. A claim that 
science is contingent in the trivial sense, however, offers the hard-boiled contingentist little 
succor. Trivial contingency is agnostic about the aspects of science that are typically of interest 
to philosophers, and so has little bearing on the debate. This type of contingency is frequently 
invoked to argue that contingency need not be repugnant to the sophisticated inevitabilist. 
Sankey, for instance, argues that continental drift did not gain traction within the geology 
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community until the 1950s and 1960s, when the U.S. Department of Naval Research began 
funding ocean floor research to bolster its submarine program (Sankey 2008, 262). Naturally, if 
the research had not been funded, and had not been conducted, the trajectory taken by the science 
would have been different, but this does not bear on the claim that successful science should pass 
through stages resembling ours. Trivial contingency alters the route science takes, but remains 
silent about its destination. 
(2) Sociocultural contingency – The social structures that constitute scientific activity 
and science’s interaction with culture are contingent. 
At first glance this slightly stronger form of contingency might seem similarly innocuous. 
Like trivial contingency, it is agnostic about the content of science, acting instead on institutions, 
disciplines, communities, political relationships, and laboratory cultures. It is more complicated 
than trivial contingency, however, because it is the point where some strong contingentists dig in 
their heels. Forms of contingency that cut closer to the bone (see below) often rest on social 
determinism. A contingentist claiming that theoretical entities are contingent upon (causally 
determined by) social structures might want to deny that those social structures are themselves 
contingent. Similarly, inevitabilists might flinch when sociocultural contingency is used in 
conjunction with a stronger form, as in, for example, the controversial Forman thesis, which 
asserts that quantum indeterminacy was contingent upon the distinctive social conditions of the 
Weimar Republic (Forman 1971). 
(3) Methodological contingency – The way in which we do science might have been 
different. This moderately weak variety holds experimental and theoretical 
techniques, laboratory practice, instruments, apparatus, and heuristic devices 
contingent. 
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Contingency claims frequently target the way science functions. Sankey approximates 
this version of contingency when he describes evidence collection and instrumentation as sources 
of contingency and claims that the development of plate tectonics could only come about when 
specific instrumentation came into common use (Sankey 2008). Many historical studies have 
examined how tool selection influences the way theories develop. The literature on model 
organisms is an obvious example. Robert Kohler’s Lords of the Fly contends that the choice of 
drosophila melanogaster as the model organism for experimental genetics shaped the field’s 
development (Kohler 1994). Experimental apparatus influences the collection, packaging, and 
inflection of data, while the available mathematics, heuristics, and analogies guide how that data 
is analyzed. This type of contingency is not trivial, but it does not directly imply 
incompatibilities between existing science and science that might have proceeded with different 
experimental or analytical tools. As with sociocultural contingency it can be combined with more 
potent forms. 
(4) Interpretive contingency – The way in which we expound data in order to fill 
theoretical gaps is contingent. 
Understanding theoretical implications requires interpreting data. Data, even if they 
motivate a particular theory, often do not compel one interpretation of that theory. Take 
Cushing’s claim about the contingency of the Copenhagen interpretation: Quantum mechanics 
allows multiple logically consistent interpretations of what happens when quantum systems are 
observed. Building a satisfying ontological explanation requires physicists to interpret 
measurements that, by the very nature of the theory, do not provide the whole story. Given this 
necessary appeal to factors other than data, the interpretation we choose is contingent upon the 
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context in which the theory emerges, and an alternate interpretation might well have emerged 
given different conditions (Cushing 1994). 
(5) Theoretical contingency – This is the strongest form of contingency. In the 
constructionist mold, it holds that scientific theories themselves and the claims they 
make about the world, are contingent. 
This form postulates deep incompatibility between two possible scientific trajectories. 
While theoretical contingency can be parsed in “upon” syntax, it approximates a per se claim. 
The main difference between theoretical contingency and the in-principle unpredictability of 
scientific results is the frequent postulation by its advocates of a causal arrow from specific 
historical or cultural factors to theories. Forman’s argument that cultural instability in the 
Weimar Republic compelled physicists to accept indeterminacy, for instance, makes quantum 
mechanics’ ontological claims contingent upon the Weimar cultural environment (Forman 1971). 
This is not the same as describing science as unpredictable, but the factors on which it is 
contingent make the claim equivalent with the incompleteness contingency claim that science is 
unpredictable from internal factors alone. The per se claim and the theoretical contingency claim 
often go hand in hand, as the argument often holds that theoretical contingency works because 
theory is either almost infinitely malleable (indeterminist), and/or subject to pressures that are 
currently underappreciated (incompleteness). 
It might appear that this constitutes a spectrum given a description beginning with 
“trivial” and graduating into increasingly more serious claims, but the relationships between the 
elements are not so straightforward. Trivial contingency does not require a commitment to any of 
the other four, and theoretical contingency often implies several of the others a fortiori, but 
middle-of-the-road contingency claims cannot be so easily ranked. It would be consistent to hold 
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an inevitabilist stance about methodology, arguing that mature science motivates an optimal 
form of investigation and modeling, while maintaining interpretive contingency. It would be 
equally consistent to be inevitabilist about interpretation while contingentist about methodology. 
These examples elucidate why contingency is a “what sort” question as opposed to a “how 
much” question. If I claim that one part of the scientific process is contingent while holding that 
another is not, that does not make me more or less contingent than I would be if I held the 
inverse view. 
The categories above provide only half the picture. To complete the taxonomy a second 
layer is required. Distinctions based on what parts of science are contingent are critical, but we 
can also, invoking Beatty, draw further distinctions based on what they consider those factors to 
be contingent upon. Thus, while two people might agree that the methodological components of 
science are contingent, they might also disagree substantively about the factors upon which 
methodology is contingent. The factors upon which science, in all its aspects, might be 
contingent map onto the aspects that can themselves be held contingent: everyday events, 
sociocultural contexts, methods, interpretations, theories. 
 
4. Summary 
I have argued that the debate between contingentists and inevitabilists can be recast as an 
array of positions that directly oppose one another only over a small range of their total 
implications. Within the framework provided by Beatty, I have decomposed contingency into 
seven types, two under unpredictability and five under causal dependence. Each of these latter 
five might be further decomposed based on the “upon” relation of the contingency in question. 
These views of contingency can be held alone or in conjunction with others, and each 
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combination constitutes a distinct position, which carries different assumptions about how 
science engages with the natural world. 
Statements that science is contingent or inevitable are cumbersome when not identifying 
the area of science on which that property acts and specifying how that property operates within 
it. Science might be interpretively contingent without being methodologically contingent. It 
might be both without being theoretically contingent. Many processes play a role in the 
production of scientific knowledge. Contingency may enter through many doors; it will adopt a 
different character, with different consequences, when entering through each. The framework I 
have outlined demonstrates how science can be considered contingent and inevitable in 
qualitatively different ways and exposes assumptions about the causal structure of the scientific 
process that would otherwise remain implicit. 
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